Friday, November 23, 2012
Summary of curriculum - revised version for this semester
Monday, November 19, 2012
Correction to exam-solution covered in lecture 13
- Identify optimal response for agent as a function of w and b (with p1 and p2 in general form)
- Calculate optimal effort using the solution and adding in that p1=0.5 and p2=0.5 - This gave the answer to question 1 in the exam question
- Calculate the optimal b from the firm's profit maximization Lagrangian. In this problem, as in the first, it makes sense to do this "generally" by employing p1 and p2. I did not do this consistently in the solution I wrote on the blackboard in class. Instead, I sometimes wrote in the optimal effort given that p1=0.5, at other times using p1 and p2 in symbolic form. The error was pointed out by a student after class: This will give us the right answer to question 2, but this solution is only valid for p1=p2=0.5. In the second part of the exam, when examining how the optimal b is altered with changes in the value of p1, the equation I derived in problem 2 would not give the right answer.
Let me know in the comments if anything is unclear or confusing:
Answer to question on empirical methods
In today’s lecture some students asked whether you could be given a question where you are asked to formulate an estimation equation for some kind of empirical problem (I think I did this mostly for DiD during the lectures). The answer is, yes, you might get such a problem on the exam.
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
Here is a link to the suggested solution to part 2 by group B.
See you at the last seminar tomorrow (15/11)!
Lecture 12
The slides on Blanchard's article (which we didn't completely finish with) will follow after lecture 13.
Info about lecture 13
Friday, November 9, 2012
From seminar 5: New research on immigrants, work and disability.
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Problem set for next week's seminar
Groups A and B prepare solutions.
Lecture 11 - slides
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Seminar 5: Referee-reports
Here is the report from group C, here is the report from group D and here is the report from group F.
(Hopefully), the groups will present, and we will discuss the reports at the seminar tomorrow.
Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Slides from lecture 10
Monday, October 22, 2012
Seminar problems
As mentioned during the lecture, the seminar problems for next time consists of writing a short referee-report on a research paper. You should answer the following questions:
- What is the research question?
- Why is the question interesting and relevant?
- How do they try to answer the question?
o What kind of data
o What kind of model
o What kind of identification strategy
o What kind of institutional setting makes identification possible (is it a reform or something else)
- What do they find?
- Are the results credible?
- What kind of problems or weaknesses are discussed and tested for?
- Is there some problems not discussed or tested for you which you find relevant?
Group C: Johansson and Palme: Moral hazard in sickness insurance
Group D: Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed: Immigration
Group E: Zhang and Røed: Unemployment
Group F: Markussen, Mykletun and Røed: Graded sick leave
Lecture: Acitivity requirements in social insurance
The slides for “Activity requirements in social insurance” are found here.
The newspaper article from Ljungqvist and Sargent can be read in Dagens Nyheter
The paper Active Social Insurance by Knut Røed is forthcoming in the IZA Journal of Labor Policy and can be downloaded and read here
The paper The Case for Presenteeism by Simen Markussen, Arnstein Mykletun and Knut Røed is forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics and can be downloaded and read here
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Here is the suggested solution to problem 2 by group B. I will go through problem 1 and 2 at the seminar tomorrow.
Thursday, October 11, 2012
Problem set - Seminar 4
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
Lecture note: Moral hazard–applications
The slides for the next lecture are found here.
Wednesday, October 3, 2012
Here is the suggested solution to part 1 by group E. Here is the suggested solutin to part 2 by group F. And here is group F's do-file. I will go through the problems at the seminar today (Thursday 3/10).
A brief note on curriculum and lecture 7
Lecture 7 - two videos
Signalling theory of education in a webcomic
Not that often webcomics feature economic theory, so I’ll post this.
“The easier college gets, the dumber you look for not having a degree”
Tuesday, October 2, 2012
Links to articles and supplementary readings
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Correlation or causality?
Todays Aftenposten presents a study of obesity among kids. They find that the BMI of a three year old child is positively correlated with the mother’s BMI prior to, and during, birth.
They conclude that it is important to avoid overweight before and during pregnancy, in order to avoid obese children. Hence, it is interpret as something causal. However, as people living together tend to eat the same food and share lifestyle it is no wonder why different healt outcomes are correlated within families.
Monday, September 24, 2012
Seminar 3
The seminar problems for seminar 3 are found here.
You will need two datasets which can be downloaded here; FE_unions, Education_IV
Group E are supposed to hand in solutions to problem 1 (Flow and stock variables). Group F are supposed to hand in solutions to problem 2 (Estimation)
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Suggested solutions by group C and D - Seminar 2.
Here is the suggested solution to Seminar 2 - Part 1, by group C, and here is the suggested solution to Seminar 2 - Part 2, by group D.
Monday, September 10, 2012
Slides for lectures on empirical methods
The next two lectures will focus on empirical methods much used in labor market research and policy evaluation. You can download the slides for the lectures here.
For the first lecture I recommend reading Angrist and Pische, Mostly harmless econometrics, p. 3-68
Much of the same material is also covered in the textbook “labour economics”, but in a more condensed form, on pages 668-674.
Wednesday, September 5, 2012
Suggested solutions by group A and B - Seminar 1.
Here is the suggested solution to Seminar 1 - Part 1, by group A, and here is the suggested solution to Seminar 1 - Part 2, by group B.
Monday, September 3, 2012
Job search: Lecture notes and reading
The slides from today’s lecture are available here.
A background paper on the study of labor markets flows are The flow approach to labor markets: New data sources and micro-macro links.
You can read more on the Leibniz rule for differentiation of integrals can be found on Wikipedia.
One of the first papers studying the optimal path of unemployment benefits over time is The optimal payment of unemployment insurance benefits over time by Steven Shavell and Laurence Weiss (1979). You should at least read the introduction. I have written a short note which may help in understanding their argument, it is found here.
A more general paper assessing unemployment policy is: Unemployment insurance: Strenghtening the rrelationship between theory and policy.
Finally, I also recommend three papers that studies what I called the “benefit trap” empirically. These are Moral hazard and sickness insurance, The sick pay trap and Temporary disability insurance and labor suply: Evidence from a natural experiment.
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
Problem set for first seminar
Good luck!
Monday, August 27, 2012
Lecture 2 - Human Capital
Monday, August 20, 2012
Lecture 1 - slides
Summary of the curriculum
As mentioned in today's lecture, there will be some changes to this - but the core will remain as before.
Curriculum: Labor demand with asymmetric linear adjustment costs in a deterministic environment
Note that this is in a deterministic environment - that is: The firm thinks that "wages, productivity, product price and everything else will be the same from now and forever." The figure shows how it reacts if something happens to one of these factors (or mass quitting by workers) and the firm keeps on believing that the future will hold no further changes. If a firm faces changing conditions, on the other hand, such as business cycles, it may pay to aim for smaller adjustments then this: You don`t fire everyone you lose money on in a downturn, because you know you would then need to incur hiring costs to increase the labor stock again when demand picks up again.


